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INTRODUCTION
After a brief hiatus, the climate litigation wars have flared back to life 
in a new arena: the broad and unruly panoply of state tort law. This renewed 
fighting breaks the uneasy armistice that had emerged in 2011 when the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, foreclosed 
federal common law public nuisance torts for climate change damages by 
ruling that the federal Clean Air Act displaced those claims.1 That lull ended 
abruptly in 2017 and 2018 when a battalion of local governments in 
California, New York, Colorado, Washington State, and Rhode Island 
brought new tort lawsuits under their respective state laws against energy 
producers in both state and federal courts.2 These actions squarely raise the 
? Lecturer, University of Houston Law Center. 
1 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
2 Complaint, County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17-CIV-03222 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 
2017) [hereinafter San Mateo Complaint]; Complaint, Marin County v. Chevron Corp., No. 17-CIV-
02586 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017) [hereinafter Marin Complaint]; Complaint, City of Imperial Beach 
v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017) [hereinafter Imperial Beach Complaint]; 
Complaint, State v. BP P.L.C., No. CGC-17-561370 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Oakland 
Complaint]; Complaint, City of Richmond v. Chevron Corp., No. C18-00055 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 
2018); Complaint, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-cv-182 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 9, 2018) [hereinafter 
New York City Complaint]; Complaint, Bd. of Cty. Comm?rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), 
Inc., No. 18-cv-030349 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Boulder Complaint]; Complaint, King 
County v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2-11859-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 9, 2018) [hereinafter Seattle Complaint]. 
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80 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:79 
challenge of how to manage the possibility of multiple state and federal court 
tort actions under varying state laws against corporations, governments, and 
individuals for their roles in contributing to climate change damages. 
So far, the California tort actions have taken two different approaches. 
The first group?filed by San Mateo County, Marin County, and the City of 
Imperial Beach?alleges a broad array of classical state law tort actions such 
as public nuisance, private nuisance, negligence, trespass, and failure to 
warn.3 In addition, the governments also assert strict liability claims for 
failure to warn and design defects.4 Their lawsuits target a broad array of 
thirty-seven large fossil fuel companies, mining corporations, energy trading 
companies, and up to 100 ?John Doe? corporate entities.5 The complaints 
seek unspecified compensatory damages, equitable relief to abate nuisances, 
disgorgement of profits, punitive damages, and reasonable attorney?s fees.6
By contrast, most of the remaining plaintiffs?the cities of San 
Francisco, Oakland, and the county governments encompassing Boulder, 
Colorado and Seattle, Washington?have brought in their respective state 
courts, a narrower set of public nuisance and other tort claims against a 
comparatively small group of fossil fuel energy companies.7 For example, 
rather than seeking broad and unspecified compensatory and punitive 
damages, San Francisco?s complaint requests the creation of an abatement 
fund to help take needed steps, like construction of a dike wall to deal with 
anticipated climate change effects such as rising sea levels and enhanced 
storm severity.8
In addition to local governments in California, Colorado, and 
Washington state, the City of New York has filed its own climate tort action 
under common law theories of recovery. Rather than use its state?s courts, 
however, the City of New York brought its action in the Southern District of 
New York under federal diversity jurisdiction.9 Its complaint carefully targets 
3 San Mateo Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 78?98 (eight counts alleging public nuisance, strict 
liability, failure to warn, private nuisance, negligence, and trespass); Marin Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 
79?87 (same); Imperial Beach Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 75?95 (same). 
4 San Mateo Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 78?98 (eight counts alleging public nuisance, strict 
liability, failure to warn, private nuisance, negligence, and trespass); Marin Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 
79?87 (same); Imperial Beach Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 75?95 (same). 
5 San Mateo Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6?22; Marin Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6?23; Imperial 
Beach Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5?22. 
6 San Mateo Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 98?99; Marin Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 99?100; 
Imperial Beach Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 95?96. 
7 For example, the King County complaint lists BP P.L.C., Chevron Corp., ConocoPhilips, Exxon 
Mobil Corp., and Royal Dutch Shell P.L.C. Seattle Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1, 4?8. The complaint also 
leaves room for up to 10 Doe defendants. Id. 
8 Oakland Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 39. 
9 New York City Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 13?14 (asserting diversity jurisdiction). 
39895-fiu_13-1 sym
posium
 Sheet No. 44 Side A      09/13/2018   14:52:31
39895-fiu_13-1 symposium Sheet No. 44 Side A      09/13/2018   14:52:31
C M
Y K
2018-07-29 HESTER FINAL(WINDOWS) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/3/2018 7:46 PM 
2018] Climate Tort Federalism 81 
only five energy corporate defendants in a way that preserves the parties?
complete diversity,10 and specifically eschews any claims for damages 
arising from federal land that might create a federal question. The City has 
demanded monetary compensation for its damages and requested a jury trial. 
The most recent lawsuit has arisen in Rhode Island, where the state has 
brought a state law tort action in its Superior Court against 21 named energy 
companies and up to 100 John Doe defendants.11 The lawsuit alleges, like the 
other state actions, that the companies knew that their products contributed 
to climate change, but they continued to sell them through misrepresentations 
and false statements.12 The state raises several state tort causes of action, 
including public nuisance, negligent failure to warn, negligent design defect, 
trespass, and strict liability failure to warn and design defect.13 In addition, 
Rhode Island also contends that the companies? actions impaired the state?s
public trust resources and violated its state Environmental Rights Act.14 The 
complaint seeks equitable relief (including abatement of the nuisance), 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and disgorgement of profits,15 and 
it also requests the costs of the suit itself.16 This action, for the first time, 
involves an action by an attorney general on behalf of the state government 
itself rather than a local county or municipal government.17
While all of these cases remain at the earliest stages of motion practice 
and dispositive motions, they have already generated a flurry of notable 
tactical maneuvers, precedent-setting innovations in case management, and 
10 The complaint targets BP P.L.C, Chevron Corporation, ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil 
Corporation, and Royal Dutch Shell PLC. Id. ¶¶ 16?23. It specifically contends that the defendants are 
citizens of California, New Jersey, Texas, Delaware, England, and the Netherlands. Id. ¶ 31. 
11 Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct. Providence Cty. 
July 2, 2018) [hereinafter Rhode Island Complaint]. 
12 Id. ¶¶ 106?224. 
13 Id. ¶¶ 225?93. 
14 Id. ¶¶ 294?314. 
15 Id. ¶ 315. 
16 Id. The request for costs could prove especially important because Rhode Island retained outside 
counsel to serve as co-counsel with the Attorney General. The use of outside counsel, especially on a 
contingency fee basis, has proven enormously controversial in natural resource damages litigation brought 
by state agency trustees. Julie E. Steiner, The Illegality of Contingency Fee Arrangements When 
Prosecuting Public Natural Resource Damage Claims and the Need for Legislative Reform, 32 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL?Y REV. 169 (2007). 
17  As this article was going to press, the City of Baltimore filed its own climate tort lawsuit 
against 26 energy corporations on July 20, 2018. See Complaint with Request for Jury Trial, Mayor & 
City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 24C18004219 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City July 20, 2018). Like 
many of the prior actions by other local governments, the city?s complaint alleges that the defendants 
made false statements on climate science and fuel emissions, and it asserts counts of private nuisance, 
public nuisance, trespass, strict liability failure to warn, negligent failure to warn, strict liability design 
defect, negligent design defect, and the state?s Consumer Protection Act. Id. ¶¶ 107?30. 
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82 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:79 
important substantive rulings. All of the California court cases and the 
Washington action have already seen motions to remove them to federal 
court on differing grounds,18 and some of the plaintiffs have responded by 
either dismissing problematic defendants19 or vigorously opposing the 
grounds for removal and dismissal posed by bankrupt defendants.20 The fast 
pace and varying fora have, unsurprisingly, already generated conflicting 
rulings: one judge has found that federal common law controlled the local 
government?s tort claims as they relate to the defendants? marketing and sales 
of petroleum products,21 moved ahead with substantive briefing (including 
an innovative ?climate science tutorial?),22 and then decided to defer to the 
legislative and executive branches by dismissing the complaints.23 The 
Southern District of New York reached a similar conclusion and also 
dismissed the action before it,24 and the City of New York had already 
announced its intent to appeal the ruling.25 By contrast, the San Mateo County
court ruled that federal common law does not control the lawsuit, and instead 
remanded the removed case back to the California trial court.26 The decisions 
in both cases will likely end up in a quick appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Given 
18 See, e.g., Notice of Removal, King County v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-CV-00758-RSL (W.D. Wash. 
May 9, 2018). As of the date of this article, the defendants in the Colorado and Rhode Island state court 
actions have not sought to remove the cases to federal court. 
19 The City of San Mateo voluntarily dismissed without prejudice Statoil USA (an agency of the 
state of Norway) from its original complaint on July 17, 2017. Chevron Corporation and Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. subsequently brought a third-party complaint against Statoil on December 15, 2017. Third-Party 
Complaint of Defendants Chevron Corporation and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. for Indemnity and Contribution 
Against Third-Party Defendant Statoil USA, County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17-CV-4929-
VC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017). The renewed presence of Statoil, as a unit of a foreign sovereign entity 
arguably entitled to sovereign immunity defenses, will likely bolster Chevron?s attempts retain the lawsuit 
in federal court. 
20 The Eastern District of Missouri bankruptcy court enforced the discharge and injunction 
provisions of Peabody Energy?s Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan by enjoining San Mateo, Imperial Beach, 
and Marin Counties from pursuing their tort action against the companies. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 
No. 16-42529-399, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3691 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017). 
21 Order Denying Motions to Remand at 5?8, California v. BP P.L.C., No. 17-CV-06012 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Oakland, Denying Motion to Remand].
22 Notice re Tutorial at 1?2, California v. BP P.L.C., No. 17-CV-06012 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018). 
23 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints, California v. BP P.L.C., No. 17-CV-
06011-WHA (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2018). 
24  Opinion and Order, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-CV-00182-JFK (S.D.N.Y. 
July 19, 2018). 
25  Brendon Pierson, Oil Majors Win Dismissal of New York City Climate Lawsuit, REUTERS
(July 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/new-york-climatechange-lawsuit/oil-majors-win-
dismissal-of-new-york-city-climate-lawsuit-idUSL1N1UF1YC. 
26 Order Granting Motions to Remand at 1?3, County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17-
CIV-03222 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2018) [hereinafter San Mateo, Order Granting Motion to Remand]. 
Judge Chhabria stayed the remand order for 42 days while Judge Alford?s conflicting ruling in the Oakland 
trial underwent expedited appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Id. 
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2018] Climate Tort Federalism 83 
the quick proliferation of venue and jurisdictional challenges, a litigative 
maelstrom looms ahead. 
This essay explores how judicial federalism principles can help organize 
and structure these emerging state law climate tort initiatives. Rather than 
add to the debate on whether courts are institutionally suited to hear these 
claims in the first place, or whether federal or state courts would offer the 
better venue, this analysis instead simply assumes that these state law actions 
are coming. If so, we could soon face a situation where multiple state and 
federal courts will host sprawling and conflicting state law climate liability 
tort claims involving overlapping plaintiffs and defendants. What principles 
offer the best path to structure and manage such an overwhelming litigative 
scrum?  
Judicial federalism concepts could provide some of the guidance needed 
to structure and coordinate litigation in multiple fora at different levels of 
federal and state government. While most prior academic analysis has 
centered on how federalism allocates power between state and federal 
legislatures or agencies, similar concerns regarding preemption, 
displacement, and coordination will shape the complementary roles of federal 
and state courts in these lawsuits. The differing and idiosyncratic ways that 
state courts handle climate torts will reflect fundamental policy choices and 
principles built into the U.S. Constitution, federal and state judicial and 
environmental statutes, and long-standing fundamental precedents and 
judicial practices on civil procedure. 
This essay begins with a brisk look at the fate of prior federal common 
law climate tort actions, and sketches out the basic tenets and prior analyses 
of judicial federalism and its role in mass-party litigation. It then closely 
examines how climate tort claims under state law will pose fundamental 
challenges to the existing allocation of powers and responsibilities between 
federal and state courts, especially when federal courts host actions 
controlled by state law and when state courts hear claims involving 
extraterritorial impacts and the exercise of judicial authority over non-
resident parties. Finally, after reviewing several instances where uncontro-
versial judicial notions of substantive jurisdiction and procedural rules yield 
troublesome results when applied to state law climate torts, it concludes with 
suggestions on how to use federalism principles to resolve some of these 
difficulties and better harmonize state law climate torts with the requirements 
of judicial federalism. 
I. REVIVAL OF CLIMATE TORTS IN NEW FORA
The resurgence of climate tort litigation may seem puzzling given the 
ignominious fate of earlier federal climate tort lawsuits. In a highly 
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84 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:79 
publicized trio of cases?American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,27
Comer v. Murphy Oil Co.,28 and Village of Kivalina v. Exxon29—plaintiffs 
brought a variety of federal common law tort claims to recover damages or 
seek injunctive relief from large numbers of corporate defendants who had 
allegedly contributed to global greenhouse gas emissions. Those cases have 
received extensive discussion elsewhere,30 and each lawsuit offered very 
different plaintiffs, alleged injuries, actions by defendants, and requested 
relief. For example, while Comer sought to bring a class action tort claim for 
monetary compensation for damages caused when Hurricane Katrina was 
allegedly exacerbated by anthropogenic climate change, American Electric 
Power Co. featured public nuisance claims by state and local governments 
seeking an injunction to force reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases 
from the defendant?s fossil-fueled power plants.31
Their differences, however, ultimately mattered far less than their key 
similarities. First, the district courts in all three cases originally dismissed the 
tort actions on a variety of grounds before reaching the merits. In two of those 
cases?American Electric Power Co. and Comer?their respective appellate 
courts reversed the trial judges? dismissals and remanded the cases for 
substantive proceedings. In doing so, both the Fifth Circuit and the Second 
Circuit initially held that the claims did not pose a non-justiciable political 
question, met Article III standing requirements, and posed facially valid 
theories for tort recovery.32
Second, and more important, all three cases ultimately ran aground in 
the U.S. Supreme Court. After granting certiorari to review the Second 
Circuit?s ruling in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., the Court 
unanimously found that the federal Clean Air Act had displaced any potential 
federal common law climate tort claims that might have existed previously.33
According to Justice Ginsburg?s majority opinion, the displacement occurred 
when Congress gave EPA the power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
27 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
28 585 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2009), revised Oct. 22, 2009, vacated by order granting en banc 
review, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed for lack of quorum, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
29 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
30 A literature search on the American Electric Power Co. decision alone, for example, yielded 
over 1,900 law review articles discussing the decision on the HeinOnline database. 
31 Compare Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 415?19 with Comer, 585 F.3d at 859?60. 
32 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); Comer, 585 F.3d at 859. 
33 Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 415. Notably, the Court split evenly on the narrower question 
of whether the state governments had standing to bring their public nuisance tort actions at all. Id. at 419?
20. Justice Sotomayor, after participating in the oral argument on the case before the Second Circuit before 
her elevation to the Supreme Court, recused herself from the Court?s decision. 
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under the Clean Air Act-?even if EPA chose not to exercise that power.34 The 
Court?s prior landmark ruling that the Clean Air Act unambiguously 
classified carbon dioxide as a ?pollutant? subject to regulation under the 
Clean Air Act (as well as imposing a duty on EPA to determine whether 
greenhouse gas emissions posed an endangerment to human health or the 
environment)35 cemented American Electric Power Co.?s conclusion that 
Congress had displaced any possibilities of federal common law tort liability 
for those same emissions.36
The American Electric Power Co. ruling effectively brought down the 
curtain on further federal common law climate tort actions. On remand, the 
Second Circuit and the Comer district court each dismissed the tort actions 
with prejudice based on the American Electric Power Co. opinion?s
rationale.37 The Ninth Circuit, which had abeyed its consideration of the 
Kivalina trial court?s dismissal ruling, joined its brethren shortly afterward 
and upheld the trial court?s dismissal.38 While each of these actions also 
alleged state law tort actions under the district courts? supplemental 
jurisdiction,39 the federal courts in all three cases dismissed the corollary 
actions once the primary federal common law tort actions collapsed. Federal 
and state common law actions have continued under other theories?namely, 
multiple lawsuits seeking to hold federal and state governments accountable 
for their failures to control greenhouse gas emissions under the public trust 
doctrine40?but the use of common law tort actions to seek climate damages 
had almost completely faded from legal actions in U.S. federal courts. 
So why renew the wars? The new lawsuits reflect a conscious strategic 
choice to revive climate actions by using aspects of state court systems that 
fundamentally differ from the federal judicial fora and laws. Most 
importantly, the switch to state law claims within a state court system (or a 
federal court?s diversity jurisdiction) potentially sidesteps the most 
34 Id. at 423. 
35 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528?29 (2007). 
36 Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 426?29. 
37 As noted earlier, a panel of the Fifth Circuit initially issued an opinion that concluded the district 
court had both subject matter jurisdiction and competence to hear the tort claims raised by the class action 
defendants. That decision, however, was vacated when the full Fifth Circuit voted to rehear the case en 
banc. When subsequent recusals by the judges deprived the court of a quorum, the Fifth Circuit lost its 
capacity to hear the appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently refused to hear an appeal of the case 
brought via a writ for mandamus. See supra note 28.
38 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
39 Tracy D. Hester, A New Front Blowing In: State Law and the Future of Climate Change Public 
Nuisance Litigation, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 49, 77 n.103 (2012) (plaintiffs invoked the federal district 
court?s supplemental jurisdiction to hear related state law claims in all three cases). 
40 Michael C. Blumm & Mary C. Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, 
and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (2017). 
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troublesome barriers that bedeviled federal common law tort climate claims: 
displacement defenses, standing challenges, political question limitations on 
judicial competence, and barriers to admissibility of expert testimony and 
evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.41 Because state courts 
generally operate as courts of general jurisdiction, they avoid the deeply 
rooted limits woven into federal judicial powers as courts of limited 
jurisdiction subject to separation of powers constraints and Article III textual 
limitations.42
Despite this fundamental difference in approach and fora, a re-
enactment mentality has already set in. Virtually all of the initial public media 
coverage and scholarly comments pointed out the unhappy history of the 
federal common law tort claims and the likely parallel challenges that would 
arise against the California actions.43 The most generous initial assessments, 
in fact, acknowledged the differences between the first California lawsuits 
and the prior trio of federal climate tort actions, but nonetheless pointed out 
the significant hurdles and barriers that the California lawsuits will face.44
Given the ongoing battles over removal, bankruptcy bars, preemption, 
displacement, standing, justiciability, equitable defenses, and other numerous 
procedural and jurisdictional challenges that the defendants will likely raise, 
these difficulties are as daunting as promised. 
Rather than revisit these jurisdictional and procedural skirmishes, this 
essay instead takes seriously the possible need to manage and administer state 
climate tort lawsuits. In particular, it assumes that some of the current crop 
of California, Colorado, Washington, Rhode Island, and New York climate 
tort actions will successfully navigate the threshold challenges raised against 
them, and that they will then proceed into full-fledged substantive discovery 
and summary judgment duels. In this scenario, a large and varying cohort of 
entities that contributed to recent or historical greenhouse gas emissions may 
face a host of state law tort suits before multiple fora and varying state civil 
procedures. This variety, however, contrasts with the most unique features of 
climate tort claims?namely, these lawsuits allege tortious actions that have 
effects on a global scale even if the acts themselves of emitting greenhouse 
41 See Hester, supra note 39, at 55?67. 
42 Id. at 73. 
43 See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Chevron Says Climate Change Lawsuit ‘Not Viable’ As It Prepares to 
Educate Judge on Science, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/03/21/chevron-says-climate-change-lawsuit-not-
viable-as -it-prepares-to-tutor-judge-on-the-science/#a8a141edcd478; John Schwartz, Climate Lawsuits, 
Once Limited to the Coasts, Jump Inland, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/climate/exxon-climate-lawsuit-colorado.html. 
44 See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Climate Lawyers Hope “Public Nuisance” Strategy Reverses Years of 
Failure, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/02/12/climate-
lawyers-hope-public-nuisance-strategy-reverses-years-of-failure/#25449c8670f8. 
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gases are indistinguishable among a vast host of sources at the local level. 
The location of emissions that give rise to state court jurisdiction, from that 
perspective, seems almost accidental. 
Before exploring the potential challenges posed by full-throated climate 
state tort litigation, at least one substantive threshold challenge needs close 
examination because it may affect the ultimate disposition of all the state tort 
actions. The most immediate and weighty challenge to state tort law climate 
actions will likely center on preemption challenges. More specifically, 
defendants will almost certainly shift some of their prior displacement 
challenges in the federal common law tort actions to a more rigorous 
preemption attack by alleging that the federal Clean Air Act substantively 
preempts state law tort actions that impose liability for federally permitted 
emissions or set out equitable restrictions on federally authorized releases.  
To some extent, the U.S. Supreme Court has already outlined the 
principles of preemption for cross-border state environmental tort claims in 
its seminal decision in International Paper Co. v. Oulette.45 When faced with 
a claim that the federal Clean Water Act46 preempted a nuisance tort claim 
brought in a Vermont state court for damages incurred in Vermont caused by 
a discharge in New York, the Court ruled that the Clean Water Act only 
allowed state tort nuisance actions in the courts of the state which issued the 
Clean Water Act permit that governed the discharge.47 This approach, the 
Court reasoned, would protect dischargers from multiple lawsuits in differing 
fora to recover damages from discharges permitted by a different state.48 It 
also consolidated responsibility on the discharger?s state to assure that its 
permits protected the environment and the public against damaging 
releases.49 Despite this guidance from Outlette, however, a circuit split has 
developed on whether the federal Clean Air Act preempts state law tort 
actions over emissions from permitted facilities.50
Extending Oulette?s rationale to preempt state law climate tort actions 
against interstate point sources of greenhouse gas emissions creates 
significant problems. First, and most importantly, as Oulette demonstrates, 
45 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
46 The federal Clean Water Act contains clauses to preserve state law claims that parallel similar 
provisions in the Clean Air Act. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1370 (West 2017). In fact, Congress essentially adopted 
the Clean Water Act?s preemption and state law preservation provisions when it subsequently adopted the 
federal Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(e) (West 2017). 
47 Oulette, 479 U.S. at 498?500. 
48 Id. at 496?97. 
49 Id. at 492?500. 
50 Compare N.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (cross-border 
air emission tort claims preempted) with Merrick v. Diageo Ams. Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 
2015) and Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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the threshold for preemption of state common law claims is significantly 
higher than the burdens to show displacement of federal common law tort 
actions. The former task evokes significant federalism concerns and risks a 
damaging intrusion into areas traditionally reserved for state regulatory 
authority. Second, the potential for preemption based on a direct conflict 
between federal Clean Air Act permit authorizations and state tort law actions 
has receded in light of EPA?s retreat from requiring facilities that emit solely 
greenhouse gases to obtain permits under the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration program,51 as well as its announced intent to withdraw 
requirements to reduce greenhouse gases from new and existing coal-fired 
power plants under the New Source Performance Standard program.52 More 
fundamentally, Oulette applied to cross-border emissions from a source in 
one state that caused harm in a different state?while with greenhouse gas 
emissions, both the emissions and the harm can readily, or even typically, 
occur on both sides of a state border. Here, plaintiffs may face the same 
burdens of overlapping legal obligations and conflicting burdens of proof that 
the defendants faced in the simpler factual setting of Oulette.
The issue of cross-border emissions and the proper site for state law tort 
actions becomes especially pressing when the laws differ dramatically 
between states. For example, Texas has already legislatively hobbled the 
ability to bring nuisance actions for emissions of greenhouse gases in 
Texas.53 As a result, the choice of state law in this context can determine the 
outcome of a tort action, but the typical criteria used to select the applicable 
law for an action?for example, the situs of the harm, the nexus between the 
activity and the injury, or the citizenship of the defendant54?may have little 
relevance to emissions of greenhouse gases that potentially contribute to 
climate change damages on a global scale.55
51 80 Fed. Reg. 50,199 (Aug. 19, 2015). EPA withdrew these portions of the rules in respect to 
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), which rejected EPA?s interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act to impose permit obligations on sources that emitted only greenhouse gases. 
52 These rules are also known as the Clean Power Plan. The EPA has issued an Advance Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking to withdraw the Clean Power Plan, see State Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,507?08 (proposed Dec. 28, 
2017), and it is conducting public listening sessions to solicit input on whether and how to revoke the rule, 
see Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 4620 (proposed Feb. 1, 2018). 
53 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.257 (West 2017) (creating an affirmative defense against state law 
nuisance actions arising from emissions of greenhouse gases from facilities that have permits under 
delegated federal environmental programs for the activities that released the gases). 
54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
55 The federal Clean Air Act allows states to assume primacy for implementing and enforcing their 
own clean air laws and rules in lieu of the federal program through the process of delegation. The 
delegation process in turn imposes some degree of uniformity among state programs and laws that must 
satisfy baseline federal Clean Water Act requirements. If a state lacks authority to issue air permits to 
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Last, Oulette?s rationale for the situs of tort claims may have little 
applicability if the theory of liability shifts away from the emitting activities 
themselves. For example, in the Oakland litigation, the trial court refused to 
dismiss the claims or remand them to state court because it found that the 
activities underlying the tortious claim centered on: 
[A]n alleged scheme to produce and sell fossil fuels while 
deceiving the public regarding the dangers of global 
warming and the benefits of fossil fuels. Plaintiffs do not 
bring claims against emitters, but rather bring claims against 
defendants for having put fossil fuels into the flow of 
international commerce. Importantly, unlike [American 
Electric Power Co.] and Kivalina, which sought only to 
reach domestic conduct, plaintiffs? claims here attack 
behavior worldwide. While some of the fuel produced by 
defendants is certainly consumed in the United States 
(emissions from which are regulated under the Clean Air 
Act), greenhouse gases emanating from overseas sources are 
equally guilty (perhaps more so) of causing plaintiffs? harm. 
Yet those foreign emissions are out of the EPA and Clean 
Air Act?s reach.56
Given this shift away from greenhouse gas emissions and federal 
permitting for activities that cause them, Oulette’s careful allocation of 
jurisdiction and responsibility for permitted sources does not facially apply 
to the production and sale of fossil fuels.57
The earlier federal common law tort actions gingerly broached this 
topic, but failed to tackle it fully. Because Comer, Kivalina, and Connecticut 
v. American Electric Power Co. each raised state law claims under the district 
court?s diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, the three appellate decisions 
each touched on preemption grounds in different ways. For example, the 
Fifth Circuit?s panel opinion in Comer (now vacated by the en banc order) 
found that ?the clear inapplicability of federal preemption in this case?
weighed against using political question doctrine to dismiss the tort action as 
facilities under the federal Clean Air Act (and the EPA has not imposed separate federal requirements 
under a Federal Implementation Plan), the Outlette rationale facially would not apply. Here, the EPA no 
longer insists that state must prepare their own implementation plans to issue PSD permits to control 
greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, states can have enormously different approaches to regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions without the constraints of an overlapping federal air permitting framework. 
56 Oakland, Denying Motion to Remand, supra note 21, at 7. 
57 It should be noted, however, that the federal Clean Air Act also imposes comprehensive and 
nationally coordinated requirements for the composition and distribution of mobile source fuels and 
additives. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7545?46 (2018). 
39895-fiu_13-1 sym
posium
 Sheet No. 48 Side B      09/13/2018   14:52:31
39895-fiu_13-1 symposium Sheet No. 48 Side B      09/13/2018   14:52:31
C M
Y K
2018-07-29 HESTER FINAL(WINDOWS) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/3/2018 7:46 PM 
90 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:79 
a ?de facto preemption of state law.?58 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in 
Kivalina noted that, while the U.S. Supreme Court?s direction in American 
Electric Power Co. required the Ninth Circuit to dismiss the tribe?s federal 
common law claims as displaced by the Clean Air Act, the district court had 
already dismissed the state law claims without prejudice so that the plaintiffs 
could pursue their action in the Alaskan courts.59 And in Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power Co., the Second Circuit explicitly declined to rule 
on state law public nuisance claims because it concluded that federal 
common law controlled the action.60
The new round of state law complaints has already created conflicting 
decisions by the California district courts on the possibility of preemption. In 
the Oakland litigation, Judge Alsop concluded that the cities? public nuisance 
claim was ?necessarily governed by federal common law,? which therefore 
preempted California common law claims.61 His rationale, however, focused 
on aspects of the claim alleging marketing of fuels outside the United States 
which could still be subject to federal common law despite Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power Co.62 By contrast, the San Mateo court remanded 
its cases to the California state courts because it concluded that the Clean Air 
Act?s displacement of federal common nuisance claims meant that no federal 
common law remained to justify removal to federal court.63
The Southern District of New York recently added to the discord by 
dismissing the City of New York?s tort action.64 Judge Keenan?s rationale 
closely paralleled Judge Alsop?s prior opinion in the Oakland dismissal: the 
plaintiffs alleged injuries that arose from the worldwide marketing and sales 
of fuels that consumers used on a global scale. This enormous scope of 
58 Comer v. Murphy Oil Co., 585 F.3d 855, 879 (5th Cir. 2009). 
59 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 866 (9th Cir. 2012) (Pro, J., 
concurring).
60 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 392 (2d Cir. 2009). 
61 Oakland, Denying Motion to Remand, supra note 21, at 3. 
62 Id. Judge Alsop rested his conclusion on both the need for a uniform standard of decision, ?[a] 
patchwork of fifty different answers to the same fundamental global issue would be unworkable,? and the 
plaintiff?s reliance on the defendants? actions in marketing fuel products outside of the United States. Id. 
at 4?5. Interestingly, he did not rule on whether the Clean Air Act?s displacement of federal common law 
left open possible state law actions against solely domestic emitters of greenhouse gases. Id. at 6?7. 
63 San Mateo, Order Granting Motion to Remand, supra note 26, at 2?3 (?Because federal 
common law does not govern the plaintiffs? claims, it also does not preclude them from asserting the state 
law claims in these lawsuits. Simply put, these cases should not have been removed to federal court on 
the basis of federal common law that no longer exists.?). Judge Chhabria, however, left open the possibility 
that federal law might still preempt the nuisance claims. Id. at 5 (?It may even be that these local actions 
are federally preempted.?). 
64  Opinion and Order, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-CV-00182-JFK (S.D.N.Y. 
July 19, 2018). 
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international activities raised special concerns of international relations and 
the need for consistent standards for judgment that demand the application of 
federal common law rather than state tort law.65 Once federal common law 
precluded state tort law, however, the American Electric Power Co. decision 
made clear that the Clean Air Act had already displaced any federal law. 
Therefore, no action could take proceed, and the court dismissed the action.66
This stark division between the federal district courts on such funda-
mental issues augers an inevitable appellate review and, potentially, conflicts 
among the Ninth, Second, and Tenth Circuits.67 The dismissals in the 
Oakland and New York City cases create some sense of momentum against 
the current crop of lawsuits, but several factors may challenge a quick 
appellate affirmance of those decisions. First, all three district courts in each 
of the original wave of federal common law climate tort actions dismissed 
the lawsuits on various grounds. Two of those decisions were initially 
reversed in the Second and Fifth Circuits, however, and the Ninth Circuit?s
review was truncated by the U.S. Supreme Court?s intervening decision in 
American Electric Power Co. Federal appellate courts here may similarly 
offer a greater willingness to uphold the federal courts? power to hear climate 
tort claims, even if they subsequently decline them on prudential, procedural, 
or substantive grounds. Second, both the Oakland and the New York City 
dismissals focus on the federal common law?s preemption of state law tort 
claims without examining whether the federal Clean Air Act?s express 
statutory preemption provisions68 might require more than a general reliance 
on federal common law to preempt this entire class of state law claims. While 
this statutory preemption analysis would be undoubtedly complex and hard 
to predict,69 this approach would give proper weight to Congress? setting of 
the scope of preemption rather than general federal common law principles.70
65 Id. ¶¶ 10?13. 
66 Id. ¶¶ 13?22. 
67  This prediction focuses on, obviously, decisions that originate from federal district courts. 
State court decisions (including appellate reviews) resting on adequate and independent state law grounds 
may offer limited, if any, grounds for federal judicial review. See discussion infra note 80. 
68  42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2018) (citizen suit provision, which simultaneously operates as a 
savings clause); id. § 7416 (?Retention of State Authority?). 
69  As noted above, the federal appellate courts have already split on the scope of preemption 
of state law tort claims by the federal Clean Air Act over interstate emissions. See discussion supra note 
49. Notably, both the Oakland and the New York City dismissals focused on the plaintiffs? attempt to shift 
the alleged wrongful action from combustion of fossil fuels generally to the marketing and false represen-
tations related to sales of fossil fuels. The Clean Air Act, however, imposes extensive requirements on the 
composition and distribution of fuels, and the fuels program of the Clean Air Act has one of the statute?s
strongest federal preemptive effects. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521?54 (2018). 
70  While both the Oakland and New York City dismissals emphasized the primary roles of 
the legislative and executive branches when they declined to craft a new federal common law tort cause 
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II. NAVIGATING THE CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
PRINCIPLES
If the traditional tools of preemption or displacement will not 
necessarily offer a viable means to cabin the scope of state law tort actions 
for climate liability, how can the courts navigate a potential morass of 
overlapping, burdensome, and conflicting state lawsuits? One possible 
strategy might lie in the foundational principles of judicial federalism. 
Federalism concerns have not suffered from a lack of attention by legal 
scholars, and judicial federalism concepts in particular have spurred the 
development of a rich and complex body of scholarship and analysis.71
Judicial federalism explores how the core principles underlying federalism 
affect the allocation of powers and responsibilities between federal and state 
judicial systems and administration of justice. To some extent, it necessarily 
overlaps with the larger body of law focused on how state statutes and 
common law coordinate with federal laws. But by focusing on judicial 
powers and systems, it weighs those same concerns within the narrow sphere 
of the scope and frailties of judicial power itself.  
The current climate change policy debate has largely not focused on the 
judicial aspects of federalism. Much of prior federalism legal scholarship has 
centered on the proper allocation of authority between Congress and states 
on the formulation of legislative priorities. For example, numerous scholars 
have explored how aggressive state legislative initiatives (such as 
California?s carbon trading and greenhouse gas emission regulations) might 
conflict with powers and responsibilities vested solely or primarily in 
Congress.72 To the extent that judicial federalism concerns in climate liability 
tort actions have surfaced, they have largely helped analyze how federal 
of action, each opinion relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court?s recent opinion in Jesner v. Arab Bank, 
PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). That decision, however, stressed the importance of deferring to the 
legislative branch when interpreting statutory language that pertains to international relations and the 
conduct of the nation?s foreign affairs. Id. at 1403. These concerns led the Court to interpret the Alien Tort 
Claims Act to not support claims against foreign corporate entities. Id. at 1398?1402. While these concerns 
will inform the court?s construction of the Clean Air Act preemption provision, the Jesner rationale should 
not be read to broadly foreclose the development of federal common law causes of action outside of the 
context of statutory interpretation. 
71 See, e.g., Thomas Baker, A Catalogue of Judicial Federalism in the United States, 46 S.C. L.
REV. 835 (1995) (and sources listed therein). 
72 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Shana Starobin, The Legal Risk of Regulating Climate Change at 
the Subnational Level, REGULATORY REV. (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/09/18/coglianese-starobin-legal-risks-climate-change-subnational/. 
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statutes and regulations can constrain or preempt the ability of state courts 
and judges to hear certain tort claims alleging climate damages.73
A. Judicial Federalism Foundations and Constitutional Mechanisms 
In the judicial arena, federalism principles provided the justifications for 
creating dual federal and state judicial systems and allocating power between 
them. The differences between the systems include, for example, the 
inherently limited subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts as 
compared with the typical general jurisdiction of state courts, the capacity for 
federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over individuals outside the 
boundaries of a particular state (if Congress has statutorily granted the federal 
court that power), and the ability of federal court actions to invoke the power 
of the Supremacy Clause to override conflicting state court decisions based 
on federal constitutional or statutory precepts.74
The creation of these overlapping judicial systems reflects the deep 
policy principles that underlie U.S. federalism. While maintaining two 
overlapping and (arguably) duplicative judicial systems appears puzzling at 
first glance, this arrangement serves important purposes. For example, it 
protects non-resident litigants from favoritism towards local claimants by 
allowing removal of certain claims to federal court and the ability to seek a 
federal forum even for claims rooted in state law under the court?s diversity 
jurisdiction. Similarly, the availability of a federal court system presumably 
helps assure greater uniformity of decisions through the availability of federal 
judicial review. It also protects federal authority and avoids fragmentation 
and disruption of national standards and policies through federal judicial 
implementation of preemption and displacement principles.  
At its most fundamental level, the dual court systems reflect a 
substantive democratic choice about the suitability of particular courts or fora 
for certain categories of claims, including the availability of federal citizen 
suit actions under environmental programs delegated to state governments 
for administration, the investment of exclusive jurisdiction for certain claims 
in federal courts, and the statutory force and uniformity behind the federal 
judiciary?s civil and criminal procedural rules. Notably, these principles of 
judicial federalism should allow the federal and state judicial systems to 
73 See, e.g., Alexandra Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate 
Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1698?99 (2008); Sean Mullen, The Continuing Vitality of the 
Climate Change Nuisance Suit, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 697, 700 n.20 (2011). 
74 See Hester, supra note 39, at 55?78 (for a deeper discussion of these distinctions). 
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operate as complements to each other?s authority rather than struggle in a 
zero-sum conflict over their respective jurisdictions and powers.75
To implement these goals, the U.S. Constitution uses a combination of 
express textual commitments in Article III and other constitutional provisions 
as well as structural allocations of power between the federal and state 
governments. These features have received deep and detailed judicial and 
scholarly analysis in other settings, but some of them bear special mention in 
the context of state law climate liability tort litigation. The Supremacy 
Clause, for example, obviously plays a central role in assuring that the federal 
judiciary retains the ultimate authority to render dispositive opinions on 
certain questions reserved to it by statute or constitutional allocation. On a 
more prosaic level, the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects the ability of 
U.S. citizens to enforce the judgments of one state?s courts in the judicial 
forum of another state or the federal judicial system, including climate 
liability judgments rendered in one state that are enforced in another state.76
The U.S. Constitution also helps harmonize the overlapping federal and state 
judicial systems through providing for original jurisdiction for the U.S. 
Supreme Court to review judgments involving state parties77 or to review 
final state judgments involving federal issues.78 Last, federal principles of 
statutory interpretation help coordinate activity between the two judicial 
systems by bending statutory interpretation to promote certain systematic 
values, such as the federalism clear statement principle and the 
extraterritoriality canon.79
The principles of judicial federalism are also woven into the federal 
judicial fabric through Article III?s investiture of judicial power itself. For 
example, Article III?s sculpting of federal judicial power through standing 
doctrine reflects the limited jurisdictional powers of the federal courts versus 
75 These comments, of course, apply primarily to federal courts invested (and limited) with judicial 
power under Article III. Other courts and decisional bodies, such as Article I courts, administrative law 
judges and tribunals, and arbitral bodies, do not face these constraints and may have opportunities to 
operate in different ways. 
76 Beyond the Full Faith and Credit clause?s mandate in U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, section 1738 of 
the Judiciary Act requires federal courts to give the same full faith and credit to a state court?s ruling that 
the court?s home state would grant to it. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (West 2017). Notably, federal law alone 
dictates the res judicata effect of a federal court?s ruling. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 
(AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
77 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (granting original jurisdiction to U.S. Supreme Court for matters 
?in which a State shall be party . . . .?). 
78 While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for Supreme Court review of state court 
decision, the Judiciary Act of 1789 permits review of state court judgments. The Supreme Court 
vigorously upheld this authority in Martin v. Hunter?s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Similarly, 
the federal courts typically cannot review state court rulings regarding state law (unless they pose some 
federal issue). See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 625?26 (1874). 
79 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115?16 (2013) (extraterritoriality canon); 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461?64 (1991) (federalism clear statement principle). 
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2018] Climate Tort Federalism 95 
the broader mandates of state general courts, and the scope of other doctrines 
that constrain federal judicial review?such as the political question 
doctrine?reinforce the complementary role of the federal judiciary in 
relation to the state court systems. 
These aspects of judicial federalism have already begun to appear?and 
shape?state law climate tort actions. They have developed both on the 
vertical plane (as allocations of authority between federal and state 
judiciaries) and the horizontal plane (as mediations between competing 
judicial actions in differing state judiciaries). 
1. Vertical allocations of judicial authority (federal-state) 
The role of judicial federalism appears most starkly in its distribution of 
powers between the federal and state judiciaries. The most preeminent 
example, of course, is the availability of federal judicial review for state law 
cases brought either under the court?s diversity jurisdiction or its 
supplemental jurisdiction on related federal law claims. In these 
circumstances, the federal judiciary can offer a separate forum to resolve 
issues under state laws that directly pertain to the imposition of liability for 
climate damages under state law tort actions.80 In doing so, the federal court 
would provide a venue to resolve foundational liability issues while allowing 
claimants to resort to the federal courts? procedural rules, inherent 
jurisdictional authority for enforcement and remedies, and purportedly more 
neutral setting. Notably, the City of New York filed its state law climate tort 
action directly in federal district court under its diversity jurisdiction.81
Similar dynamics drive the allocation of authority under standing 
doctrines. As noted previously, the federal courts rely on narrower 
jurisdictional limits for their ability to grant standing to certain claimants. 
These constraints arise from the fundamental investiture of judicial power in 
those courts under Article III. State courts, by contrast, enjoy the capacity to 
hear broader classes of claimants than their respective state constitutions or 
statutes might allow.82 As a result, judicial federalism principles in this 
80 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (West 2017). Of course, the scope of federal judicial review of state 
court decisions remains constrained to state rulings on questions of federal law. To the extent that a state 
court rules on a climate tort lawsuit solely on state law grounds (or on federal and state legal claims that 
involve an adequate and independent state ground), the federal courts generally should not have 
jurisdiction to review the state court?s ruling absent both invocation of federal constitutional or other 
federal legal concerns, and the unavailability of state review of that federal claim. See Murdock, 87 U.S. 
(20 Wall.) at 593. 
81 New York City Complaint, supra note 2. 
82 For example, the constitutions and statutes of Mississippi and Hawaii allow broader bases for 
standing in their respective state courts. The plaintiffs explicitly relied on Mississippi?s broader notions 
of standing to support their claims in the Comer lawsuit. Hester, supra note 39, at 61?62. 
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context will seek to allocate greater power to state courts to hear claims that 
fall outside traditional Article III standing doctrine, including potential 
climate tort litigants who may not offer the same concrete injury-in-fact or 
facially redressable claims that federal judicial prerequisites would demand. 
Other doctrines driven by judicial federalism to distribute powers 
between the federal and state judiciaries could play potent roles in dictating 
which court systems, if any, can hear climate tort liability claims. Most 
notably, federal political question doctrines have already played a pivotal role 
in limiting initial judicial hearings on climate tort actions brought in federal 
courts under federal common law, and they may play a similar role in state 
law claims ushered under federal diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. In 
addition, abstention doctrines?including Pullman,83 Burford,84 and
Colorado River85?could serve to insulate state court determinations from 
federal judicial review and effectively allocate the power to resolve climate 
tort liability claims to state judiciaries in lieu of federal courts.86
Beyond these jurisdictional prerequisites, judicial federalism concepts 
also offer powerful constraints on the federal court?s consideration of the 
merits of climate liability tort claims under state law. In particular, the Erie 
doctrine dictates that federal courts typically adhere to state substantive laws 
to resolve claims while relying on federal procedural law to hear those 
claims.87 As a result, it will require the federal courts to choose which aspects 
of a state?s tort laws constitute substantive or procedural legal obligations in 
a climate liability action.88 Given the enormous liability stakes raised by 
some of these claims and the potentially outcome-determinative effect of this 
categorization, the judicial federalism aspects of certain routine aspects of 
trial management?such as the admissibility of expert testimony and the 
application of state privilege laws?may assume dramatically higher profiles. 
83 R.R. Comm?n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (federal courts can abstain from hearing 
federal constitutional claims to give state courts an opportunity to address those issues). 
84 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (federal court can abstain from taking case under 
its diversity jurisdiction when state court would have greater expertise and issue involves important state 
policies or values). 
85 Col. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (federal court has 
limited discretion to dismiss action where concurrent jurisdiction with state courts threatens duplicative 
or wasteful litigation). 
86 Federal courts may also enjoy dominant or exclusive jurisdiction in areas where state law 
climate tort claims impinge into the federal government?s foreign affairs authority under the U.S. 
Constitution. In addition, the Judiciary Act precludes federal courts from enjoining state court 
proceedings, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (West 2017), but this bar is riddled with numerous exceptions. State 
judiciaries also cannot enjoin federal court proceedings or bar individuals from filing federal claims. Gen. 
Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977); Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964). 
87 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
88 Hester, supra note 39, at 73. 
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2018] Climate Tort Federalism 97 
Last, the federal courts may have to navigate judicial federalism 
constraints on their ability to provide the relief requested in climate liability 
tort actions. For example, if a claimant requests injunctive relief, the federal 
courts may face limits on their ability to weigh the equities related to the 
injunction if a federal statute constrains the court?s ability to look outside 
Congressionally determined values.89 Because these constraints arise from 
the foundational nature of the federal courts? powers, those courts may not 
be able to grant injunctive relief even if the underlying claims rest on state 
laws and the state?s courts could otherwise issue the injunction. 
2. Horizontal allocations of judicial authority (state-state) 
Judicial federalism principles also steer the allocation of powers 
between the courts of differing states. In particular, beyond dividing power 
between the federal and state courts, these principles also require that the 
respective state courts respect each other?s decisions and assure the integrity 
of their separate operations within federal constitutional constraints. For 
example, while a state court cannot display favoritism to claimants based on 
their residence or citizenship, judicial federalism limitations nonetheless 
allow a state court to entertain claims brought by a sovereign of that state that 
its private citizens or nonresidents could not bring (for example, by 
recognizing the legislature?s waiver of statute of limitations periods for 
claims brought by the state).90
Next, the horizontal allocation of judicial powers under federalism 
constraints also arises starkly with extraterritorial claims. In particular, a state 
judicial forum may lack in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defen-
dants that a federal court could nonetheless exercise.91 This constraint may 
prove especially critical with climate tort liability claims that seek recovery 
from defendants who have emitted from locations literally throughout the 
world. Beyond the simple exercise of jurisdictional authority, these judicial 
federalism principles also inform how state judiciaries interpret state tort laws 
89 Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
90 The U.S. Supreme Court has long acknowledged the authority of state legislatures to modify 
the conditions for statutes of limitations that might apply to claims brought against their sovereign state 
governments. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 528 (1857); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 
311 (1843). 
91 A federal district typically can exercise jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the long-arm 
jurisdictional statute of the state where the federal court sits. If the state?s law does not extend personal 
jurisdiction, the federal court can nonetheless exercise jurisdiction when the accompanying federal statute 
authorizes it or the case involves an alien party otherwise outside the state court?s jurisdiction. Federal 
district courts can also reach parties outside the state who live within the federal judicial district and within 
100 miles of the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B)?(2). 
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or statutes to apply to extraterritorial activities. Like the federal courts, many 
state court systems will interpret a state statute to apply outside the borders 
of that state only upon a clearly expressed desire by the state legislature to 
grant its law an exterritorial reach.92
Last, if one state judicial system?s judgment to impose climate tort 
liability must be enforced in another state that does not recognize the legal 
basis for such claims, horizontal constraints will also quickly surface. For 
example, Texas has enacted legislation that specifically limits the imposition 
of tort liability for damages allegedly caused by the emission of greenhouse 
gases from activities otherwise regulated by federal laws or permits.93
Defendants may wish to resist the collection or enforcement of such a 
judgment by alleging that the Texas statute establishes a public policy against 
the enforcement of such foreign judgments. In addition, many states have 
passed tort reform legislation that limits the ability of claimants to recover 
punitive damages, impose joint and several liability, or pursue claims for 
injuries that occurred prior to a statute of repose (even if not discovered until 
later).94 It remains unclear whether these tort reform statutes will have the 
unintended effect of foreclosing climate liability tort claims on a sweeping, 
or even categorical, basis. 
B. Potential Roles for Judicial Federalism Principles in Climate Tort 
Liability Litigation 
So how can judicial federalism help direct the administration and 
management of state law climate liability tort actions, in both federal and 
state court systems? On the horizontal conflict level, judicial federalism 
principles could urge a broader interpretation of the Oulette and American 
Electric Power Co. precedents to allow the pursuit of state law climate tort 
claims in states where the injury occurred (rather than the place of the 
emission), because the greenhouse gases that contributed to the harms could 
be emitted from virtually any location. This approach would respect both the 
92 Similar concerns may drive a state judiciary?s willingness to apply forum non conveniens 
doctrines to climate liability tort claims rooted in state laws when the causative actions, testifying 
witnesses and parties, and responsive documents all lie within a different state or nation. 
93 See discussion supra note 53. 
94 ANDREW C. COOK, THE FEDERALIST SOC?Y, TORT REFORM UPDATE: RECENTLY ENACTED 
LEGISLATIVE REFORMS AND STATE COURT CHALLENGES (2012), https://fedsoc-cms-
public.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/h51Xzdd6qKP4hY5Jw6e2hSAL4ZyWWiUcT5bHD05i.pdf 
(summarizing recent state tort law reform initiatives); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT 
REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES 3?8 (2004), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/report.pdf. Cf. CTS Corp. v. 
Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) (CERCLA fails to preempt state statutes of repose for hazardous 
substances exposure claims). 
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Congressional allocation of power and permit authority within the general 
framework of the federal Clean Air Act, while upholding the powers of state 
court judiciaries to resolve these claims under their respective laws and 
procedures. 
On the vertical plane, the resolution of conflicts between federal and 
state judicial powers and competence will also depend heavily on the specific 
facts and parties underlying the climate tort action. Of course, federal courts 
routinely demonstrate the capacity to handle complex environmental claims 
brought by large numbers of plaintiffs against numerous defendants, and they 
have developed innovative and effective tactics to administer complex trials 
and contested proceedings. In the vast number of tort actions following the 
Deepwater Horizon incident,95 for example, the federal trial court used novel 
scheduling and discovery tactics, bifurcated and staged trials for liability and 
allocations, and bundled pleading and discovery processes to expeditiously 
resolve tort claims that otherwise might have lasted for decades.96 While 
climate liability tort actions differ in critical and fundamental ways from the 
contamination tort actions brought after the Deepwater Horizon spill,97 they 
nonetheless offer opportunities for similarly creative docket management 
techniques and dispositive motion practice. 
If states choose to coordinate their approaches to climate tort claims, 
judicial federalism principles could also affect their strategies. If state 
plaintiffs entered into a formal arrangement to share litigation costs or 
prospectively allocate damage awards, this agreement arguably might raise 
questions about the limits imposed by the Compacts Clause of the U.S 
Constitution.98 Attempts to use class actions in conjunction with aggressive 
res judicata and collateral estoppel claims may also face federal or state 
95 The blowout of the Macondo deepwater well in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 led to the largest 
marine oil spill in U.S. history. See NAT?L COMM?N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING
(2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf 
(final report of national commission?s investigation into the causes of the Deepwater Horizon disaster). 
96 John Cruden, Steve O?Rourke & Sarah Himmelhoch, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
Litigation: Proof of Concept for the Manual for Complex Litigation and the 2015 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 65 (2016). 
97 For example, the California and New York state law tort actions purportedly do not pose a 
clearly federal question of law and basis for jurisdiction (i.e., admiralty jurisdiction), cannot point to a 
solitary identified incident that caused the damages, lack a clearly delineated and manageable group of 
defendants, and lack any dispute over the nexus between the actions causing the release and the damages 
suffered by the plaintiffs. 
98 The Compacts Clause of the U.S. Constitution bars states entering into ?any Agreement or 
Compact with any other State? without the consent of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The federal 
courts have struck down agreements as unapproved compacts predominantly when states use them to 
impermissibility encroach of the powers of the federal government or non-compact states. U.S. Steel Corp. 
v. Multistate Tax Comm?n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978). 
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judicial reluctance to allow the conscription of judicial mechanisms for state 
policy goals and monetary recoveries. 
III. POSSIBLE LONG-TERM TRAJECTORIES FOR JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE TORT CLAIMS
Judicial federalism has already begun to shape the state law claims 
brought in the newest wave of litigation. The imposition of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction for bankruptcy claims, for example, led to the dismissal of 
Peabody Coal from the California tort actions because the company had 
previously discharged general contingent claims as part of its recent 
bankruptcy action.99 Claims against U.S. governmental entities or agencies, 
or foreign sovereign entities or their corporate forms, will also likely run 
aground against constraints on state judiciaries to exercise jurisdiction over 
such parties.100
Beyond such sparring over the respective jurisdictional powers of state 
and federal courts, however, the ultimate effect of judicial federalism 
principles may lie in their support for legislative or regulatory action to 
clarify the power of courts to resolve climate tort liability claims. At least one 
state, as noted earlier, has already acted unilaterally to foreclose such tort 
actions explicitly, and the prior tort reform legislation passed by other states 
may unintentionally serve to accomplish similar outcomes.101 Ultimately, if 
state law climate tort actions create conflicting obligations and risks of 
catastrophic liability for U.S. industry, Congress may pursue federal 
legislation to restrict the availability of tort litigation as it has done for other 
classes of claims in the past (such as the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2017).102
In sum, the shift of climate tort liability litigation to state courts goes 
beyond a simple change in tactics. It reflects a fundamental change in the 
posture, prospects, and feasibility of these lawsuits. While the principles of 
judicial federalism will help to clarify the allocation of powers and 
responsibilities between the federal and state court systems when faced with 
overlapping or conflict state law tort claims, the prospect of conflicting and 
incommensurate verdicts and liabilities will increase pressures for either 
regulatory or legislative actions on both the federal and state levels to provide 
99 See, e.g., In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529-399, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3691 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017) (dismissing climate tort claims as subject to bankruptcy bar raised by company?s
prior Chapter 11 proceeding). 
100 See discussion supra note 19 (motions to implead Statoil as a third-party defendant after the 
plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed it because of concerns over sovereign immunity). 
101 See discussion supra note 53; see also Hester, supra note 39, at 74. 
102 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1443, 1711?15 (West 2017). 
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a more unified and consistent answer to climate liability claims. These 
actions should aim to provide greater democratic accountability, economic 
predictability, and judicial consistency in this emerging field of liability 
claims. 
